White-collar Workers, History of

Thou. Prinz , in International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, 2001

7 Social Theory

White-neckband workers were introduced into the realm of modern social science at the end of the nineteenth century. The starting point was twofold: (a) the notion of a growing number of occupations, employments, and functions that shared many traits of the working-form while at the same time differing in important aspects from manual workers as well every bit from the higher social strata; (b) the exceptional rapid growth of these categories in the decades around the turn of the century which fifty-fifty outdid that of the manual workers.

The about intensive debates on white-collar workers took place in German language-speaking countries from virtually 1890 upwards to the 1930s confronting the background of the formation of stiff labor movements (largely blue-neckband) and of a political system, dominated past conservative elites eager to defend the condition quo and in search of numerically important allies amongst the general population. In the first stage of the debate, which took place before the First World War, status quo-oriented scholars identified white-collar workers as function of a new socially stable and bourgeois 'eye estate' and, at the same time, encouraged the country to appoint in a social-protective policy (e.k., white-collar specific insurances and labor laws) while Marxist theorists predicted a full general proletarianization of these groups. The 1920s saw a convergence of opinions, reinforced by the sceptical notion that the 'new middle class' in German-speaking countries seemed to figure prominently among the mass base of National Socialism. The label of a potential for right-fly extremism has stuck to the group always since, non to the lowest degree through the intellectual influence of German language social scientists, many of whom were forced to immigrate in the early 1930s (Fromm 1984, Speier 1986). The notion showed upwards once more in many theories of Fascism developed in the 1950s and 1960s, generalizing what was seen to be the experience of the interwar years (Lipset 1960). In dissimilarity, social historians who took up the contend in the 1970s tried to demonstrate the pecularities of the German language and Austrian experience (e.g., Kocka 1980) while latest research has challenged the notion of a predominantly right-leaning, 'new middle class' in the 1920s birthday (Falter 1991).

The debate over the role of white-collar workers in the mass base of operations of National socialism represented the climax and at the same time a turning signal. Interest in interpretations of the white-collar grouping as a whole has subsided (only see Schulz 2000) in Frg as well as in other countries where it never figured prominently.

Not surprisingly, with regard to the heterogeneity of the group, social science attributed contradictory attitudes and social functions to these groups, often parting from specific traits of subgroups. One of import theme over the decades has been the bear upon the expansion of white-collar occupations has had on the emancipation of women, whether information technology offered new opportunities for social mobility or whether it only helped to reproduce traditional inequalities (Suhr 1930). In that location has been much research on the affect of rapid technological modify on office piece of work through the decades, some with more than pessimistic, others with more optimistic overtones. Studies of the service sector, for case, stress its relative resistence to alter equally a result of the need to maintain a workforce even when in that location is no constant demand, a fact which has been labeled 'guard labor.' Other scholars take pointed to the fractional regain of autonomy on the work-place as role of the automation movement in the 1970s which was said to have led to the formation of a 'new worker' (Mallet 1963). Actually, the contend referred to members of the technical staff supposedly holding key positions for potential labor disputes. Another important context was the rise of modern consumer society since the Start World War in Europe and the Usa. The concentration of large numbers of white-collar employees in larger cities led to the identification of them with the urban population as a whole, regarding them as pioneers of modern consumption and new forms of leisure (Coyner 1977). This notion dates back to the influential study first published in 1924, of the German social writer, Siegfried Kracauer (Kracauer 1998) and translated into many languages ever since. It has been taken up in diverse studies of the historic development of mod consumption and leisure, leaving out, with regard to the white-collar population, those members of the group living in smaller and centre-size cities.

Though, in the second half of the twentieth century, interest for white-collar employees in the social sciences has flared up from time to time, at that place seems to exist no hereafter for any revival of a wholesale white-collar worker sociology every bit it developed in some European countries during the interwar years. One of the most important prerequisites, the beingness of a self-conscious socialist working-form, no longer exists. With its disappearance the interest of social scientific discipline, policy-makers, and the dissimilar groups that brand up this strata to develop a broad definition based upon the distinction betwixt 'u.s.,' the 'white-neckband,' and 'them,' the 'blue-collar workers,' seems to have vanished. What remains is a remarkable gap betwixt the numerical importance of the group in question and its relative neglect by social scientists in the last decades.

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Policy challenges

Klaus Prettner , David E. Bloom , in Automation and Its Macroeconomic Consequences, 2020

7.three Labor market policies

Considering automation is purported to result in a lower amass need for labor (which is, as we take seen, controversial), i frequently raised proposal is a policy measure to reduce the length of the statutory work week to distribute available piece of work amidst more individuals. This change could prevent a state of affairs in which some individuals accept to conduct the total burden of unemployment deriving from the transition to new technologies. In add-on, according to the testify in the study by Collewet and Sauermann (2017) for (mostly part-time) workers in telephone call centers, reducing working hours could lead to increasing productivity due to reductions in fatigue, even if the number of hours worked is already comparatively low.

However, a reduction in working hours without a corresponding reduction of worker salaries implies higher unit labor costs. This, in turn, would hasten the transition to automated production and could thereby accept negative medium- and long-run consequences for labor demand. 3 In addition, a legally binding regulation of statutory working hours does non necessarily stand for well with the private preferences of workers. Corneo (1995) shows in this context that a reduction in statutory working times actually raises inequality in terms of individual well-beingness, every bit leisure can be conceptualized as a normal good whose demand increases with income. Thus, loftier-income individuals would do good unduly from a reduction in working times.

A police force compelling the reduction in working hours as a policy response to automation is therefore probable to be ineffective, at all-time, and might accept detrimental effects in terms of employment and income inequality, at worst. That said, the tendency since the Industrial Revolution has been a dull only gradual decrease in working hours per employee, such that office of the productivity increment that technological change brought materialized not in the course of higher wages but in more leisure time. A gradual reduction of working hours over time, together with wages that increase by less than productivity growth due to automation, could therefore exist a practical and beneficial strategy to follow for futurity labor bargaining sessions between workers and firms.

Another possible policy response to the plush adjustments associated with automation would be to increase the efficiency of the search-and-matching procedure to reduce frictional unemployment. Cords and Prettner (2019) show that automation implies college frictional unemployment for depression-skilled workers and lower frictional unemployment for high-skilled workers. Increasing the efficiency of the search engineering science tin can help to mitigate the negative effects on low-skilled workers. One concrete policy example is the Hartz Three reform in Germany 4 that revamped job centers past creating the "Federal Office for Labour" and led to a strong increase in the number of chore center employees who try to match employers with vacancies to the unemployed searching for jobs. In the course of this reform, the number of unemployed persons per advisor—and thus waiting times to re-employment—decreased essentially. This shift was plausibly associated with an increment in the number and quality of job matches and, thereby, could accept contributed to the substantial subtract in unemployment in Germany since the implementation of the Hartz reforms in the mid-2000s.

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High-Engineering Crime Miscreants: Profiles, Motives, and Philosophies

Dr. Gerald L. Kovacich , Dr. Andy Jones , in High-Technology Crime Investigator's Handbook (Second Edition), 2006

Contour OF THE HIGH-Engineering science AND INTERNET FRAUDSTERS

Technology fraudsters, like other technocriminals previously discussed, can be anyone—organized crime members, white-neckband workers, drug dealers, people in debt, people wanting revenge, greedy people—anyone, nether the right circumstances.

Don't forget that high-technology fraud offenders differ petty from the "average" person. According to some studies, 7 virtually offenders commit fraud for the aforementioned reasons most criminals commit crimes, as we previously discussed: motive, opportunity, and rationalization. Studies also indicate that most calculator crimes have been committed for personal financial gain, followed by being intellectually challenged, to help the organization, and as a consequence of peer pressure level or to gain peer recognition.

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Changes in the Wage Construction and Earnings Inequality

Lawrence F. Katz , David H. Autor , in Handbook of Labor Economic science, 1999

2.1 Changes in the US wage structure, 1963–1995, March CPS data

Changes in the US wage structure over the past several decades are illustrated using data on the weekly earnings of full-time, full-year, wage and bacon workers (those working 35   h or more per week and working at least twoscore weeks in the previous calendar year) from the March CPSs of 1964 to 1996 (covering earnings from 1963 to 1995). six The core sample is further restricted to adults prior to retirement age (those aged 19–65 at the survey date), without allocated earnings, who earned at to the lowest degree $67 per calendar week in 1982 dollars (equal to one-half of the 1982 real minimum wage based on a forty   h week). 7 Weekly earnings are imputed for those with top-coded earnings by multiplying value of the top code by 1.five. The qualitative aspects of the findings are not very sensitive to these restrictions and imputations with the exception of the handling of outliers with extremely low weekly earnings. When workers with extremely low reported weekly earnings are kept in the sample, we detect a pronounced (and implausibly large) reduction in most measures of inequality (especially for women) in the 1960s. 8 The findings reported in this section are quite similar to those of other analyses of the March CPS data including Gottschalk (1997), Juhn et al. (1993), Karoly (1993), Katz and Murphy (1992), and Murphy and Welch (1992, 1997).

Fig. i (following the approach of Juhn et al., 1993) plots the change in log real wages by percentile for both men and women from 1963 to 1995. The effigy displays a substantial widening of both the male and female wage distributions with the wages of workers in the upper end (the 90th percentile) rising by approximately xl% (34 log points) relative to those in the lower stop (the 10th percentile) for both men and women. ix There is essentially no existent wage gain from 1963 to 1995 for men in the bottom quarter of the distribution. The divergence of earnings is not limited to comparisons of workers at the height and the bottom. The effigy indicates an almost linear spreading out of the entire wage distribution for women and for the wage distribution above the 30th percentile for men. Fig. one as well shows that women gained on men throughout the wage distribution with the earnings of the median adult female rising 27% (23 log points) relative to the median man from 1963 to 1995. Fig. 2 illustrates that the overall wage distribution (men and women combined) likewise spread out substantially over the past few decades, especially in the top half of the distribution.

Fig. 1. Change in log real weekly wage by percentile, 1963-1995.

Fig. 2. Modify in log existent weekly wage by percentile, all, 1963–1995.

The four panels of Fig. 3 decompose changes in wage inequality (and existent earnings) from 1963 to 1995 for men and women into four sub-periods (1963–1971, 1971–1979, 1979–1987, and 1987–1995) that roughly correspond to the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. There are some striking differences across the sub-periods. There is petty overall change in wage inequality and rapid real wage growth for both men and women in the 1960s. Real wage growth slows downward in the 1970s and some widening begins in the lesser one-half of the distribution for males. There is essentially no modify in the gender gap from 1963 to 1979. The rise in wage inequality for both men and women over the entire 1963–1995 period is dominated past the rapid spreading out of the male and female wage distributions from 1979 to 1987. This design of ascent inequality continues in a more minor form for 1987–1995. Similarly the gender gap narrows in the 1980s and 1990s.

Fig. three. Modify in log real weekly wage by percentile.

Fig. 4 gives a sense of the full time series of changes in inequality for men and women by plotting the 90–10 log wage differential by sex annually from 1963 to 1995. Table 1 summarizes culling measures of wage inequality for all, men, and women for selected years from 1963 to 1995. The Gini coefficient, standard deviation of log wages, and xc–10 log wage differential show somewhat similar patterns of increases in inequality for all, men, and women. The standard deviation of log wages is a useful summary measure of wage dispersion if wages are approximately log normal, but is much more sensitive to extreme outliers at the top and the bottom than are the reported quantile measures of wage dispersion. The Gini coefficient is quite sensitive to shifts in earnings in the middle of the distribution. Ascension wage inequality has occurred in both the top and lesser halves of the wage distributions.

Fig. 4. Overall US wage inequality, 1963–1995.

Tabular array i. Measures of wage inequality for weekly wages of full-fourth dimension, full-yr workers, March CPS, 1963–1995

SD of log wage Percentiles of log wage distribution Gini coefficient
90–10 90–fifty l–10
A. Males
1963 0.469 i.19 0.51 0.68 0.250
1971 0.495 ane.16 0.55 0.61 0.270
1979 0.517 1.27 0.55 0.72 0.277
1987 0.579 1.47 0.65 0.82 0.313
1995 0.616 i.54 0.74 0.79 0.343
B. Females
1963 0.406 1.04 0.fifty 0.54 0.223
1971 0.430 1.08 0.54 0.55 0.238
1979 0.432 one.05 0.54 0.51 0.243
1987 0.506 one.30 0.61 0.69 0.281
1995 0.544 1.38 0.68 0.lxx 0.304
C. All males and females
1963 0.502 1.27 0.57 0.seventy 0.272
1971 0.530 1.31 0.62 0.68 0.293
1979 0.539 ane.35 0.66 0.69 0.299
1987 0.580 one.44 0.seventy 0.74 0.320
1995 0.603 i.54 0.76 0.78 0.340

The changes in overall earnings inequality summarized in Figs. one–4 and Tabular array 1 reverberate changes in wage differentials between demographic/skill groups and changes in inequality within groups. Table 2 summarizes the betwixt-group changes past presenting log existent wage changes from 1963 to 1995 for various groups defined by didactics, potential experience (historic period), and sex. 10 Mean (predicted) log existent weekly earnings were computed in each year for 64 detailed sex-education-feel groups and hateful wages for broader groups in each yr are weighted averages of the relevant sub-group ways using a fixed set weights (the 1980 share of total hours worked from the 1980 Demography PUMS sample) to adjust for compositional changes within these broader groups. 11 The first row of Table two indicates that (composition-adjusted) real wages grew by 7% (or 6.6 log points) over the entire period, but this growth reflects rapid growth in the 1960s and pocket-size declines since the early on 1970s. This measure of existent wage growth differs from standard measures in being a geometric (rather than arithmetic) hateful and by reflecting wages for a stock-still demographic distribution. Hence it does not reflect changes in the level of wages arising from shifts in the education, gender, or feel composition of the work force.

Table two. U.s. real weekly wage changes for full-time, full-year workers, March CPS, 1963–1995 a

Grouping Alter in mean log real weekly wage(multiplied by 100)
1963–1971 1971–1979 1979–1987 1987–1995 1963–1995
All 19.1 −   1.4 −   4.0 −   vii.ii 6.six
Sexual activity
  Men twenty.4 −   two.one −   7.3 −   ten.one 0.9
  Women xvi.9 −   0.ane 1.5 −   two.5 fifteen.8
Education (years of schooling):
  0–11 fifteen.6 i.6 −   10.8 −   9.4 −   four.5
  12 17.v one.three −   six.3 −   7.1 five.five
  13–fifteen 18.six −   ane.9 −   2.2 −   x.2 4.four
  16   + 26.0 −   seven.i 5.iii −   1.8 22.4
  16–17 23.0 −   7.iv 3.9 −   ii.ix 16.6
  xviii   + 32.3 −   six.five 8.ane 5.ix 34.5
Experience (men)
  5 years nineteen.9 −   v.eight −   ix.7 −   ix.7 −   5.iii
  25–35 years twenty.1 1.4 −   4.seven −   10.5 vi.4
Education and feel
  Didactics 12
  Experience v 19.ane −   0.8 −   18.3 −   10.seven −   x.7
  Experience 25–35 16.8 4.5 −   4.6 −   six.vi 10.ane
  Education 16 +
  Feel 5 24.2 −   12.seven 7.8 −   8.0 11.2
  Feel 25–35 34.8 −   0.iii iii.v −   2.0 32.9
a
Notes: The numbers in the table represent changes in the (composition-adjusted) mean log wage for each group, using data on full-time, full-twelvemonth workers from the March CPS roofing calendar years 1963–1995. The data were sorted into sexual practice-education-experience groups based on a breakdown of the data into 2 sexes, viii education categories (0–8, nine, 10, 11,12, thirteen–15,xvi–17, and 18   + years), and iv potential feel categories (1–x,11–twenty, 21–30, and 31   +   years). Log weekly wages of full-time, full-year workers were regressed in each twelvemonth separately past sex on the dummy variables for the 8 education categories, a quartic in experience, 3 region dummies, blackness and other race dummies, and interactions of the experience quartic with 3 broad education categories (loftier school graduate, some college, and college plus). The (limerick-adjusted) mean log wage for each of the 64 groups in a given years is the predicted log wage from these regressions evaluated for whites, living in the mean region based on the 1980 Census distribution of employment, at the relevant experience level (v, 15, 25 or 35 years depending on the experience grouping). Mean log wages for broader groups in each yr represent weighted averages of the relevant (composition-adjusted) cell ways using a fixed set up of weights (the 1980 share of full hours worked from the 1980 Census PUMS). All earnings numbers are deflated by the chain-weighted (implicit) cost deflator for personal consumption expenditures.

The adjacent two rows of Table 2 point that the (fixed-weight) mean log wage of women increased by 15 log points relative to men from 1963 to 1995 with the improvement about entirely concentrated in the 1980s and 1990s. 12 In fact, the earnings of women increased relative to those of men in virtually all education-experience categories from 1979 to 1995. Panel A of Fig. 5 illustrates the similar time pattern of changes in the female/male log wage differential for high school graduates (those with 12 years of schooling) and higher graduates (those with 16 or more than years of schooling).

Fig. five. (A) Female/male person log weekly wage differential, 1963–1995; (B) college/HS log weekly wage differential, 1963–1995; (C) returns to experience, males, 1963–1995; (D) residual wage inequality, 90–10 differential, 1963–1995.

The side by side six rows of Table 2 show the evolution of existent wages by education group. The real wage changes are, for the most part, increasing past education group over the full period reflecting a rise in education-based wage differentials (especially a sharp increment in the relative earnings of those with at to the lowest degree a college degree). The changes in educational wage differentials differ substantially beyond sub-periods. College graduates (particularly those with 18 or more years of schooling) gained substantially in the 1960s, just the higher wage premium narrowed (peculiarly for younger workers in the 1970s). Educational wage differentials increased sharply from 1979 to 1987 with the college plus/high schoolhouse wage differential rising by 12 log points. The relative earnings of college graduates continued rising into the 1990s, but those with some college take done specially poorly in the 1990s. The much studied time pattern of the overall higher/loftier school wage differential and the higher/high school wage differential for immature workers (those with 5 years of schooling) are shown in panel B of Fig. 5. Occupational wage differentials (e.yard., the earnings of professional person and managerial workers relative to production workers) also narrowed in the 1970s and so exploded in the 1980s (Blackburn et al., 1990; Murphy and Welch, 1993a).

The bottom rows of Table 2 summarize changes in existent wages for older versus younger males both overall and for loftier schoolhouse and college graduates separately. Over the unabridged sample period, the wage gap between older and younger males expanded with the earnings of elevation earners, those with 25–35 years of feel, rise by 12 log points relative to younger workers with 5 years of experience. The differences in time pattern of changes in experience differentials for loftier school and college graduates are shown in panel C of Fig. 5. Experience differentials rose more sharply for college graduates in the 1960s and 1970s, and so increased apace in the early 1980s for loftier schoolhouse graduates and narrowed in the 1980s for college graduates. The overall change for both high school and higher graduates involved substantia] increases in the relative earnings of peak earners to young workers. Wage differences by age (potential experience) also expanded for women in the 1980s (Katz et al., 1995; Gottschalk, 1997).

Nosotros have and so far considered wage differentials for groups distinguished by sex, education, and age/feel. But these factors account for just nearly i 3rd of overall wage variation so that changes in wage dispersion within these groups are likely to be an important role of changes in the overall wage inequality. Residue (or inside-group) inequality is examined here by looking at changes in the distribution of log wage residuals from separate regressions by sexual activity each year of log weekly wages on a total set of 8 education dummies, a quartic in experience, interactions of the feel quartic with three broad education categories, three region dummies, and 2 race dummies. Console D of Fig. 5 and Table 3 summarize the time pattern of changes in the log wage differential between the 90th and 10th percentiles of the rest wage distribution. Residual log weekly wage inequality for full-fourth dimension, full-year workers increased substantially by 27 log points for men and 25 log points for women from 1963 to 1995. Residual wage inequality started increas ing in the 1970s and continued rising rapidly in the 1980s and at a somewhat slower pace in the 1990s. The rise in wage inequality within groups suggests that the "least-skilled" or least-lucky" workers within each category as well as less-educated and less-experienced workers have seen their relative earnings refuse substantially over the past two decades. But the time patterns of changes in within group inequality, educational wage differentials, and experience differentials are distinctive.

Table iii. Comparison of annualized changes in educational wage differentials amid CPS and Census data sources: 1959–1996 (10   ×   annualized log changes) a

Males Females Males & Females
C   +/HS Some C/HS HS/9th grade C   +/HS Some C/HS HS/9th garde C   +/HS Some C/HS HS/9th class
A. Full-time weekly earnings
1960s
March CPS 0.149 −   0.006 0.032 0.047 0.069 0.020 0.127 0.015 0.027
Census PUMS 0.056 −   0.003 0.018 0.071 0.021 0.008 0.063 0.005 0.018
1970s
March CPS −   0.061 −   0.029 0.043 −   0.028 −   0.028 −   0.015 −   0.053 −   0.026 0.022
Census PUMS −   0.027 −   0.017 0.029 −   0.046 0.007 −   0.014 −   0.026 −   0.008 0.016
May CPS −   0.073 −   0.007 0.004 −   0.144 −   0.021 −   0.050 −   0.102 −   0.012 −   0.016
1980s
March CPS 0.167 0.065 0.068 0.139 0.064 0.083 0.158 0.065 0.072
Demography PUMS 0.159 0.060 0.032 0.159 0.064 0.035 0.159 0.060 0.033
CPS ORC- 0.168 0.067 0.042 0.133 0.075 0.098 0.156 0.070 0.061
1990s
March CPS 0.142 0.039 0.038 0.088 0.035 0.089 0.120 0.037 0.057
CPS ORG 0.109 −   0.002 0.161 0.138 −   0.012 0.056 0.122 −   0.007 0.126
B.All hourly earning (weighted by hours worked)
1960s
March CPS 0.116 −   0.018 0.016 0.003 0.072 0.045 0.090 0.010 0.020
Demography PUMS 0.063 −   0.011 0.017 0.069 0.024 −   0.011 0.071 0.001 0.008
1970s
March CPS −   0.059 −   0.032 0.007 −   0.038 −   0.008 −   0.021 −   0.045 −   0.018 −   0.007
Census PUMS −   0.039 −   0.019 0.024 −   0.105 −   0.003 −   0.021 −   0.054 −   0.011 0.009
May CPS −   0.055 0.001 −   0.016 −   0.119 −   0.022 −   0.076 −   0.079 −   0.007 −   0.040
1980s
March CPS 0.166 0.065 0.065 0.117 0.044 0.080 0.150 0.056 0.072
Census PUMS 0.144 0.054 0.035 0.135 0.059 0.027 0.144 0.057 0.031
CPS ORG 0.151 0.063 0.028 0.134 0.076 0.081 0.147 0.069 0.046
1990s
March CPS 0.076 0.002 0.060 0.095 0.028 0.015 0.086 0.014 0.043
CPS ORG 0.093 −   0.012 0.142 0.113 −   0.015 0.055 0.102 −   0.014 0.111
a
Numbers higher up are ten   ×   annualized log changes in estimated log earnings differentials. Samples are: 1960s: March 1963–1969 CPS and Census PUMS 1959–1969; 1970s: March 1969–1979 CPS, Census PUMS 1969–1979, and May 1973–1979 CPS; 1980s: March 1969–1979 CPS, Census PUMs 1979–1989, and CPS ORG 1979–1989; 1990s: March 1989–1995 CPS and CPS ORG 1989–1996. All wage differentials are estimated using separate cross-sectional log earnings regressions in each sample and twelvemonth that include x education category dummies corresponding to years of school or highest degree completed (0, i–4, 5–6, 7–8, ix, x, 11, some higher, college graduate, post-higher), a quartic in potential experience, a not-white dummy, a part-time dummy (if applicable), and iii region dummies. Pooled-gender earnings regressions include a female person dummy, and interactions between female and the experience quartic, function-fourth dimension dummy, non-white dummy, and region dummies. All samples exclude allocated observations (except the May CPS), those whose earnings are below the lowest 1 % of earners in the full sample, and those whose hourly wage exceeds the top-coded value for full-time earners. March samples are limited to those earning at least 1/2 the real value of the 1982 minimum wage converted from nominal dollars using the PCE deflator. Hourly samples include both full-and function-time workers. Weekly earnings samples are limited to full-time workers and, in the March CPS and Census PUMS, those working 40-plus weeks. Sample weights are used in all estimates and are multiplied past weekly hours in hourly wage samples or, in Census hourly samples, by weeks worked in the previous year. Earnings are imputed for top-coded observations past multiplying the value of the top code by ane.v. The college-plus/high school differential is a weighted boilerplate of the exactly college/high school differential and the mail-college/loftier schoolhouse differential where the weights are the relative employment shares of those with exactly a higher education and those with post-college didactics from the 1980 Census PUMS (for Census samples) and the 1980 CPS ORG (for CPS samples).

In summary, we conclude from the March CPS data on the weekly wages of full-time, total-year (FTFY) workers that overall The states wage inequality for both men and women expanded from the early 1960s to the mid-1990s, with changes in the 1980s accounting for much of the increase. Between- and within-grouping inequality increases both contributed to rising wage dispersion. More specifically, the college wage premium rose from 1963 to 1971, declined substantially in the 1970s, increased sharply in the 1980s, and continued to rise at a more modest pace in the first half of the 1990s. Experience differentials also expanded from 1963 to 1995. Relative earnings declines for immature workers are largest in the 1970s for college workers and in the 1980s for the less educated. Residuum wage inequality is rather stable in the 1960s, starts to increase for men in the 1970s, and increases dramatically for men and women from 1980 to 1995. Afterward remaining fairly stable in the 1960s and 1970s, male/female person wage differentials narrowed substantially in the 1980s and 1990s. The narrowing of the gender gap in earnings means that overall wage inequality for men and women combined increased past much less than wage inequality for either men or women analyzed separately. The 90–10 log weekly wage differential for all FTFY workers increased by 19 log points from 1979 to 1995 as compared to increasing by 27 log points for men and 31 log points for women over the same period.

Changes in the U.s. wage structure over the past several decades seem, at least superficially, consistent with a general rise in the labor market returns to "skill." The returns to observed skill proxies (education, occupation, and experience) have increased, and some translate the rise in within group inequality as reflecting a rising in the returns to unobserved skills (Juhn et al., 1993). An increase in the gap between the rate of growth of the relative demand for more-skilled workers and the relative supply of such workers represents a potential market-driven explanation for rising skill returns. The substantial reject in the gender gap since 1979 might reflect increased relative skills (east.k., actual experience and preparation) inside instruction-age groups or shifts in labor need favoring more femaleintensive labor market place segments (industries, occupations, particular skills). An alternative interpretation for the widening between and within group inequality is a weakening of labor market institutions and norms that compressed wages both across and within skill groups.

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Sociocultural and Individual Differences

Michael Murray , ... Michael Blank , in Comprehensive Clinical Psychology, 1998

10.11.iii.three Working Life

Rural occupations are not confined to farming and related activities. Indeed, increasingly there is a widespread range of occupations in rural areas, although absolutely there are fewer professionals and white-neckband workers than in urban centres. Despite this change, an image persists that working life in rural areas is gentle and easygoing. Behind this image in that location be quiet agony and much hardship.

Farming would seem to be an inherently stressful occupation (Keating, 1987). There are a variety of reasons for this. An important factor is the very incertitude of the task in terms of the market and the weather condition. This lack of control would be expected to lead to feelings of unease (see Belyea & Labao, 1990). Some other factor is the multiple responsibilities a farmer has in terms of work on and off the farm and with respect to the family unit. Finally, there is the changing rural scene which threatens the whole farming mode of life.

Keating (1987) considered the level of stress amid farming couples on Canadian grain farms. She found that personal resources, which was a measure of perceived mastery, was the all-time predictor of stress. In a comparable study of Ohio farmers, Belyea and Labao (1990) establish that relatively immature farmers with a large number of children and a big proportion of acreage in grain crops were virtually vulnerable economically equally measured past the debt-to-nugget ratio and the net family income. Further, those who were near vulnerable reported more than feelings of economic hardship and stress. In turn, perceived hardship and stress were related to low.

1 factor that deters many rural residents from leaving despite difficulties is the sense of family unit and community history. Many of the rural residents will come up from families who have lived in a specific customs for generations. Their whole lives are defined past the grapheme of their work and their community and it is difficult for them to imagine another mode of living. Often, they volition have been working on the farm or in the family unit business before they left schoolhouse and expect to do so until retirement as their parents did earlier them. Their work is not just a job simply a way of life. It is integrated into their daily lives. It is for this reason that a threat to their jobs becomes a threat to their whole way of life (Schroeder, Fliegel, & VanEs, 1985).

Another feature of rural employment, at least that which is based upon the exploitation of natural resources, is its seasonal nature. This has given rise to large numbers of migrant workers in both the United states of america and Canada. These workers are largely fatigued from ethnic and racial minorities (Burawoy, 1976). For example, almost farmworkers in British Columbia are Eastward Indians, Chinese, native Indians, Francophones, and migrant youth (Sharma, 1983). These workers ofttimes piece of work in atrocious weather and are clearly exploited past their employers. A 1973 Canadian Task Force study of migrant farmworkers found evidence of "kid labor, sick, pregnant, and otherwise unfit adults working with only the caput of the family unit being paid" (Sanderson, 1974, p. 405). Hopefully, weather have improved since so.

Finally, a large proportion of rural workers are without regular employment. These individuals would exist expected to feel the various deleterious effects of loss of employment (see Jahoda, 1972). Absolutely there is some show that this impact may be ameliorated in rural areas owing to the presence of social support (Harding & Sewel, 1992; Murray & Dolomount, 1995). However, the apparent turn down of such support leaves these individuals at increased run a risk of psychological distress.

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The Philippines: changes at the workplace

Jorge V. Sibal , ... Ma. Catalina Tolentino , in Globalization, Flexibilization and Working Atmospheric condition in Asia and the Pacific, 2008

1 Introduction

The dilemma of jobless growth underlines the touch on of globalization in the Philippine labour market, alongside persistent underemployment, mismatch of skills and jobs demanded, growth in curt-term contractual employment and expansion of the informal economy. From 1999 to 2003, employment in the formal economy dropped by 307,228, while employment in the informal economy expanded by nearly 2 1000000. The informal economy, which accounted for half of the employed labour strength in last decade, 1 includes wage and bacon workers in family-based or unregistered economic units, industrial homeworkers, the self- employed and unpaid family workers (Sibal, 2007). As the pressure level for global competition intensified, enterprises introduced changes in the organisation, new work methods, new technology and productivity- based employment atmospheric condition.

Employers in the Philippines accept emphasized the need to 'survive, compete and succeed in global contest'. 2 Companies resort to relentless organizational changes to achieve the all-time results – high quality products and services. Continuous reorganizations, re-technology and rightsizing are linked to more contractual employment and to lower payroll costs. Common strategies in human resource (Hour) management in Philippine companies include task evaluations, greater emphasis on operation evaluations, productivity 60 minutes systems, use of a variety of incentives and flexible pay and investments in Hour evolution through short-term training.

At the national level, reforms in Philippine labour market place policy have attempted to fill gaps past providing public employment centres, regulated chore contracting, enforcement of voluntary labour standards and rules favourable to business process outsourcing (i.east. exemptions from the prohibition of women working nights for outsourced business organisation processes such every bit telephone call centres). State labour regulations, withal, accept seemed weak or nominal due to lack of government labour inspectors. Dependence on the overseas employment of Filipino workers (OFWs), estimated at 8 one thousand thousand, has continued to be a key feature of the Philippine labour market (Opiniano, 2004).

This chapter is intended to provide new data and analysis on the impacts of these policy and economic changes on workers in the Philippines, especially their employment weather condition. To supplement the macro data that are currently available, nosotros carried out new surveys of workers and employers and also in-depth case studies for a grouping of selected companies. In doing so, nosotros investigated changes in hiring, recruitment, piece of work hours, pay and possible touch on personal and family life. The residue of the chapter is structured as follows: section 2 will review broad developments in the economy and the labour market and show disappointing performances in the quantity and quality of employment. The results of our new surveys of workers and employers are presented in section iii and are further substantiated in section four by our case studies. The affiliate will conclude in section v, which reviews reactions and proposals from the government and the social partners.

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Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Finland, and Iceland, Status of Media in

Helge Rønning , in Encyclopedia of International Media and Communications, 2003

V Cyberspace and Computers

The Nordic countries are among the most connected and computerized societies in the world. In 2000, 65% of Danes had access to a computer at home, and 46% had access to the Internet. The figures for Finland were 48 and 32%, for Iceland 74 and 65%, for Norway 71 and 52%, and finally for Sweden 64 and 52%. Typically young people use computers and the Internet more oftentimes, men more oftentimes than women, and there are likewise form differences. Blue-collar workers are less connected than white-collar workers.

The Internet is likewise the area in which the convergence betwixt media and telecommunication is most visible. In all Nordic countries there is both competition and cooperation between traditional and new media actors over control over and investment in the Internet. Typically traditional media groups such as Bonnier and Schibsted take been investing in the new digital media and the Net, as have the major telecommunications companies. In the Nordic countries, equally elsewhere, these activities take in general not been economically successful. Many of the Cyberspace portals or news services offered by other providers take had economic bug.

While the population in the Nordic countries have been fast in linking up to the Internet and acquiring the habits of using computers and mobile phones, research into the use of the new media does not point that the Cyberspace as of yet is of import as a mass medium. The Internet is mainly used for advice through eastward-mail and information seeking, often for very specialized content not related to traditional media content. It is quite probable that, in the long run, the Net will include all types of media services and become the common carrier, but fifty-fifty in the Nordic countries with their high degree of connectivity it is expected that this will take quite a long time.

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Information Society

F. Webster , in International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, 2001

two Problems of Definition

Criticisms of attempts to define the information society return us to thinkers who, while acknowledging the growth of information, refuse to endorse the idea that we have in consequence entered into a new type of globe, an data club.

Objections revolve around discontent with quantitative measures when they are used to designate qualitative change. The central criticism is that quantitative indexes of the spread of data and information technologies cannot be interpreted as bear witness of deep-seated social change. On the contrary, they can exist regarded as the consolidation of established patterns of interest and control.

Definitions of the information society offer a quantitative measure out (numbers of white-collar workers, percentage of GNP devoted to information etc), and assume that, at some unspecified point, nosotros enter an information society when this begins to predominate. But there are no clear grounds for designating as a new type of society one in which all nosotros witness is greater quantities of information in apportionment and storage.

Furthermore, it is at least intellectually possible to imagine a radically different sort of society coming into being, i that may even merit the title information society, though this transformation may be manifested in only pocket-size quantitative increases of information. That is, it may exist feasible to describe as a new sort of order one in which it is possible to locate information of a qualitatively unlike order and function, though quantitatively data changes may appear small. This does not require that we detect that a majority of the workforce is engaged in information occupations or that the economy generates a specified sum from informational activity. For example, it is possible to imagine an data society where simply a small minority of data experts hold decisive ability (scientific discipline fiction writers, such as H. G. Wells in The Fourth dimension Automobile and Kurt Vonnegut in Histrion Piano, practice this where they portray the domination of an intellectual élite).

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Republican Party

J.F. Bibby , in International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, 2001

iv The Republican Party Network of Issue-oriented Activists

American parties are increasingly networks of consequence-based participatory activists. The sources for this trend tin be found in a series of complex and interacting forces: the development of a postindustrial gild in which noneconomic social/cultural issues have gained heightened saliency; sociological and economic changes that take created higher levels of educational attainment, reduced blue collar employment, and increased number of white neckband workers; a decline in the availability of patronage as an incentive to participate in politics. Effect oriented activists have too been aided past changes in the rules governing presidential nominations that have diminished the office of elected officials and party leaders.

In the Republican Party these changes have had the effect of significantly shifting the locus of power toward ideologically bourgeois activists. In the highly participatory politics of Republican presidential nominations, candidates usually find it essential to stress their conservative bona fides if they are to have any hope of winning the nomination in a process dominated by presidential primaries and participatory political party caucuses. Activists taking a leading function in these events likewise as national convention delegates have been shown to be substantially to the right of the political party's rank and file voters (Mayer 1996). Similarly, Bruce et al. (1991) found in a report of county level entrada workers that ideological 'true believers' outnumbered 'vote maximizers' by a ratio of 4.3:1 amongst Republicans.

Issue-based groups accept gained an increasingly entrenched position within the Republican Party. The Christian Correct, for instance, has become an increasingly influential and sometimes dominant force within some state party organizations. The increasing involvement of groups and individuals whose motivation is non maximizing the vote only a delivery to policy and ideological concerns has created a problem for the Republican Party. With a bourgeois activist base that is needed for its campaign support and often to win political party nominations, candidates frequently find themselves catering to the GOP'due south most conservative elements. However, such actions tend to alienate the more moderate elements of the party and voters without strong partisan commitments—the voters that are needed to win general elections. The party's futurity depends in big part on how this intraparty problem is resolved.

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Local Labor Markets*

Moretti Enrico , in Handbook of Labor Economics, 2011

2.iii Productivity

The vast differences in nominal wages across local labor markets reflect, at to the lowest degree in part, differences in productivity. Productivity is notoriously difficult to measure directly. I empirical measure of productivity at the establishment level is total factor productivity (TFP), defined as output after controlling for inputs.

Figure v shows the distribution of average total factor productivity of manufacturing establishments in 1992 by canton. Canton-level TFP estimates are obtained from estimates of production functions based on data from the Census of Manufacturers. Specifically, they are obtained from a regression of log output on hours worked by blue neckband and white collar workers, building upper-case letter, machinery capital, materials, industry fixed furnishings and county fixed effects. 5 The level of observation is the establishment. The coefficients on the county dummies represent canton average total factor productivity, property abiding manufacture, capital letter and labor. The distribution of the county fixed effects is shown in Fig. five. The figure illustrates that there is substantial heterogeneity in manufacturing productivity beyond United states counties. The canton at the top of the distribution is 2.9 times more productive than the county at the bottom of the distribution. Log TFP in the counties at the 10th percentile, median, and 90th percentile are ane.54, 1.70 and 2.20, respectively.

Figure 5. Distribution of total factor productivity in manufacturing establishments, past county. Notes: This figure reports the distribution of average total gene productivity of manufacturing establishments in 1992, by canton. County-level TFP estimates are obtained from estimates of establishment level product functions based on data from the Census of Manufacturers. Specifically, they are obtained from a regression of log output on hours worked past blue and white collar workers, book value of building capital, book value of mechanism uppercase, materials, industry and canton fixed effects. The figure shows the distribution of the coefficients on the county dummies. Regressions are weighted past plant output. The sample is restricted to counties that had x or more plants in either 1977 or 1992 in the 2xxx or 3xxx SIC codes. In that location are 2126 counties that satisfy the sample restriction. For confidentiality reasons, any data from counties whose output was besides concentrated in a small number of plants are not in the figure (although they are included in the regression).

Figure six shows how TFP has inverse over fourth dimension. Specifically, information technology plots average TFP past county in 1977 on the x-axis against average TFP by county in 1992 on the y-axis. 6 The regression line comes from a regression of 1992 TFP on 1977 TFP weighted by the inverse of the county fixed effects' standard errors. 7 The coefficient is 0.919 (0.003), indicating a high degree of persistence of TFP over time. This coefficient is lower than the respective coefficient for nominal wages in Fig. iii. This difference may indicate that changes in productivity are not the just driver of changes in nominal wages across locations. Alternatively it may bespeak that boilerplate productivity is measured with more error than average wages and therefore displays more mean reversion. It is plausible that measured productivity contains more measurement fault than measured wages because productivity is inherently more than hard to measure and considering the sample of plants available in the Economic Census is smaller than the sample of workers available in the Census of Population.

Figure 6. Alter over fourth dimension in total cistron productivity in manufacturing establishments, past canton. Notes: The figure plots canton-level average TFP in 1977 on the x-axis against TFP in 1992 on the y-axis. County-level TFP estimates are obtained from estimates of establishment level production functions based on data from the Census of Manufacturers. Specifically, they are obtained from a regression of log output on hours worked, volume value of edifice upper-case letter, book value of mechanism uppercase, materials, manufacture and county fixed furnishings. Each regression is estimated separately for 1977 and 1992. The effigy shows the coefficients on the county dummies in each year. Regressions are weighted by plant output. The sample is restricted to counties that had ten or more plants in either 1977 or 1992 in the 2xxx or 3xxx SIC codes. There are 2126 counties that satisfy the sample restriction. For confidentiality reasons, any information from counties whose output was besides full-bodied in a small number of plants are not in the effigy (although they are included in the regression).

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